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ABSTRACT

This article explores how the U.S. and Japanese courts implement
the doctrine of equivalents when determining patent infringement. The
doctrine of equivalents is a balance of, on one hand, the public's interest
to know the metes and bounds of the patent, and on the other hand, the
private interest of the patentee to be granted a sufficient scope for the
granted patent. After comparing and contrasting the implementation of
the doctrine in Japan and the United States, I propose a new method that
places the burden on the patent practitioner, before infringement
proceedings begin, to determine the proper scope of the patent.
I. INTRODUCTION

The textual authority for U.S. patent law is derived from
Congress's power "[t]o promote the progress of science and [the] useful
arts ... "' To further this, Congress codified a standard requiring a
patentee "to particularly point out and distinctly claim[] the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention., 2 In other words,
Congress requires the patentee to set forth the metes and bounds of the
* The author is an Intellectual Property law clerk at Duane Morris LLP and a J.D. Candidate of
2010 from Franklin Pierce Law Center, NH. This article was awarded second place prize in the
Boston Patent Law Association's 2009 student writing competition.
8.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

2. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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claimed invention. This has the valuable effect of placing the public on
notice of the contents of the patent. This requirement has, however,
turned out to be difficult to apply because language is an imprecise
To remedy this, the U.S.
vehicle to describe technical concepts.
courts-and judicial systems around the world-have developed a socalled doctrine of equivalents ("the doctrine") allowing a patentee to
expand, or limit, the patent's scope.
In general, if literal infringement cannot be proven, then the
patentee may prove infringement under the doctrine.4 The doctrine
balances two competing interests. On one hand, the patent system
should grant the patentee adequate protection in exchange for public
disclosure.5 On the other hand, the patent system must provide the
public with fair notice of the invention.6 The doctrine was created to
protect the patentee from the "unscrupulous copyist" 7 who, in an effort
to use the public disclosure to his advantage, merely makes an
unimportant and insubstantial change to the claimed invention.
The main question is: How much protection should the government
grant the patentee to defend the "unscrupulous copyist"? This article
discusses how the courts of the United States and Japan attempt to deal
with the public and private interest in this context, highlighting the
similarities and the differences. To conclude, a proposal of the doctrine
is set forth to adequately serve the interest of both the patentee and the
general public.
II. THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The United States recognized the need to protect the patentee from
the "unscrupulous copyist" in 1853.8 In the United States, the doctrine
has remained a judicially created doctrine. 9 The initial stage of the
doctrine provided for broad protection of equivalents for the patentee,

3. See Ray D. Weston, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can
EuropeanApproaches Solve an American Dilemma, 39 IDEA 35,40 (1998).
4. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
5. Id.
6. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cit. 1991).
7. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
8. See infranotes 10-15.
9. See WIPO, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty art. 11(4)(b), doe. SCP/10/2, Sept. 30,
2003, availableat www.wipo.int/edos/mdocs/scp/en/scp_10/scp_10._2.pdf, at 30 (showing that the
World Intellectual Property Organization, or WIPO, in the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, has
attempted to codify the doctrine of equivalents, requiring the interpretation of claim scope to take
"due account... of elements ...equivalent to the elements expressed in the claim[l").
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but has since been limited by judicial mechanisms to limit the scope of
the claimed invention.
The case noted by many to have created the doctrine is Winans v.
Denmead.10 In Winans, the plaintiff obtained a patent claiming the
making of the body of a car "in the form of a frustum of a cone ...
whereby the force exerted by the weight of the load presses equally in all
directions .... ,"11 After visiting plaintiff's shops and measuring the
dimensions of the body, the defendant created the same body of a car in
an octagonal shape-not a cone shape.12 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant merely changed the form of the body, accomplishing
substantially the same result, upon substantially the same principal,
through the same mode of operation. 13 After dismissing literal
infringement, the Supreme Court held that it was a question for the jury
to decide whether defendant's cars had been constructed "substantially
on the same principle and in the same mode of operation, [to]
accomplish the same result."1 4 The Court noted patent protection would
be at stake if the public was free to vary the patent's form or proportions,
unless a specific form or proportion was disclaimed.15
Winans, on one hand, was a catalyst for the expansion of patent
rights for the patentee; while, on the other hand, Winans introduced an
amount of unpredictability to the scope of the patent. 16 Because of this
broad, unpredictable doctrine, the courts slowly began to limit the
doctrine's applicability. To this effect, the courts have focused on three
limitations: "prior art" limitation, "dedication to the public domain"
limitation, and "prosecution history estoppel" limitation. 7
For the "prior art" limitation, the patentee must prove that if his
claim were written to encompass the allegedly infringing product (i.e.,
the alleged equivalent feature) the Examiner would have still allowed
it. 8 This is a direct implication of the codified U.S. patent law that
requires the invention to be novel.1 9 Thus, if the patentee fails to prove

10. 56 U.S. 330 (1853).
11. Id. at 331.
12. Id. at 332.
13. Id.at 334.
14. Id. at 346 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
15. Id at 343 (majority opinion) (providing an early mention of prosecution history estoppel);
see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
16. See generally Winans, 56 U.S. 330.
17. See infra notes 18-27.
18. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
19. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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that he would have been able to obtain a patent with the alleged
equivalent feature, the infringement action fails.
The "dedication to the public domain" limitation bars a patentee
from asserting as an equivalent a feature that was disclosed in the
specification of the patent, but not within the claims.20 For instance, in
Johnson & Johnston, the patentee claimed an aluminum substrate while
disclosing both a steel substrate and an aluminum substrate. 21 The
patentee attempted to broaden his literal claim language to encompass
the steel substrate. 2 The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this
argument by stating that if a patentee fails to claim a feature mentioned
in the specification, then that specific feature is dedicated to the public
and the claim cannot be broadened to encompass that feature.23 This has
substantially limited the doctrine and forces patent practitioners to
encompass all features of the specification they plan to protect.
The previous limitations are important, but the most controversial is
the "prosecution history estoppel" limitation. This applies a rebuttable
presumption that surrenders to the public the technology involved in
recorded arguments made to the USPTO-including, but not limited to,
amendments under 35 U.S.C. § 112, amendments for prior art purposes,
and the record of an Examiner interview-during the prosecution of the
patent. 24 For example, if the Examiner rejects a claim under 35 U.S.C. §
112 for defects in description, and the claim is amended to include a pair
of one-way sealable rings with a "magnetizable" outer sleeve, the
presumption will apply.25 Once this presumption applies, the Court has
placed the burden on the patentee to rebut the presumption by proving
either: 1) the alleged equivalent was "unforeseeable at the time of
amendment"; 2) the amendment "bore no more than a tangential relation
to the equivalent in question"; or 3) "some other reason" why the
equivalent was not included.2 6 As a result, prosecution history estoppel
has severely limited the broadening of the literal scope of the claims. In
fact, according to a recent study, before Festo the patentee won 27.6

20. Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
21. Id.at 1050.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 1051.
24. Matthew Eggerding, Comment, Dependent Patent Claims and Prosecution History
Estoppel: Weakening the Doctrine ofEquivalents, 50 ST.Louis U. L.J. 257, 265 (2005).
25. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,737 (2002).
26. Id.at 740-41.
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percent of equivalents cases, and after Festo the patentee has only won
22.2 percent. 27
The modem day doctrine was set forth by the Court in WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.28 Here, the plaintiff
obtained a patent for an ultrafiltration purification process.29 During
prosecution the patentee added "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0"
to distinguish over prior art that disclosed the process at a pH "above
9.,3o Importantly, a reason for the lower pH limit of 6.0 was not
provided in the amendment or the patent's specification. 3' The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant had infringed this patent through use of a
similar process at a pH level of 5.0.32
The Supreme Court first set forth the general rule: "[Ilf two devices
do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish
substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ
in name, form, or shape. 33 The Court emphasized that the important
inquiry is whether the accused product contains "elements identical or
'
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention."
Moreover, the Court stated that the known interchangeability of
substitutes, at the time of infringement, is a factor to determine whether
the accused device was the same.35 Further, the Court stated that this
objective inquiry-determined on an element-by-element basis, not the
invention as a whole-is a question for the jury to decide.36 After
determine if
analyzing these concepts, the Court remanded the case to 37
the patentee had a valid reason for the lower pH level of 6.0.
Due to the complexities and the inherent subjectivity in this
objective standard, the doctrine has been a highly litigated subject. In
sum, the doctrine is conducted through the function-way-result test, as

27. John R Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents,59 STAN L. REV. 955, 980 (2007).
28. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
29. Id.at 22.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 23.
33. Id. at 35 (citing Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878)). This is
otherwise known as the function-way-result test. The Court, however, did note that the
"insubstantial differences" test might be better suited for other cases. See Warner-Jenkinson Co.,

520 U.S. at 39.
34. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
35. Id.at 36.
36. Seeid.at38.

37. Id. at 41. Remember, this case was decided before Festo so the Federal Circuit did not
have any specific guidelines to determine if there was a valid reason for the lower limit.
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an objective inquiry determined by the jury on an element-by-element
basis after the "prior art" limitation, "dedication to the public domain"
limitation, and "prosecution history estoppel" limitation have been
considered. This article will now analyze how Japan balances the same
competing interests.

III. JAPAN AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Japanese courts also allow a patentee to protect a patent beyond the
literal scope of the claims. In Japan, a patentee is required by law to
submit a "scope of claims" portion in the patent application that "shall
state a claim or claims and state for each claim all matters necessary to
specify the invention for which the applicant requests the grant of a
patent., 38 Additionally, similar to U.S. patent law, the technical scope of
the patent is limited to the scope of the claims in light of the description
in the specification. 39 This provides the underlying basis for the
Japanese courts in balancing the interests of the patentee and the public
when implementing the doctrine.
The Japanese courts view the doctrine as an instance where the law
"gives more weight to substance than to formality in order to avoid
unfair results." 4 This view, however, does not drastically change the
use of the doctrine in Japan in relation to the United States.
In the famous Ball Spline4 1 case, the Supreme Court of Japan set
forth the general guidelines for the doctrine.42 Here, the Court found
elements C, D, and E of the patent literally infringed by the accused
product.43 The Court also found the remaining elements, A and B,

38. Japanese Patent Act, art. 36(2) and (5).
39. Id.at art. 70(1).
40. Toshiko Takenaka, The Doctrine of Equivalents after the Supreme Court "Ball Spline"
Decision, CENTER FOR ADVANCED RES. & STUDY ON INTELL. PROP. NEWSL. (U. of Wash. Sch. of

at
available
1999,
Winter/Spring
Wash.),
Seattle,
Law,
4
http//www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/default.aspx?year=1998&article--newsv5i jpI
(citing K.. Kouken v. K.K. Tatsumi Ryouki, 52 MINsHO 113 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. 1999) (noting that
that being said, Japan has consistently given the public's interest more weight when having to make
the distinction) ("Takenaka r"). See also Toshiko Takenaka, The Doctrine ofEquivalents in Japan,
Center for Advanced Res. & Study on Intell. Prop. Symp. Publication Series No. 6 (U. of Wash.
available
at
2000,
Wash.),
Seattle,
Of
Law,
Sch.
http//www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Symposium/Number6/Takenaka.pdf(("Takenaka IF').
41. Tsubakimoto Seiko v. THK K.K., 1630 HANREI JIHO 32 (Jap. Sup. Ct. 1998) (hereinafter
Ball Spline).
42. Takenaka I, supra note 40 (citing Ball Spline).
43. See Shusaku Yamamoto & John A. Tessensohn, Doctrine of Equivalents Adds Torque to
Japanese Patent Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 483, 485 (discussing Ball
Spline).
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"within the technical scope of the invention" and the interchangeability
of substitutes known to one of ordinary skill in the art before the
application was filed. 44 As a result, the Supreme Court overruled the
Tokyo High Court's holding of infringement under the doctrine because
elements A and B were known in the prior art.4
The Court established five elements that must be met to assert
successfully the doctrine.46 The five elements are: 1) the elements the
accused infringer interchanged must not be an "essential" part of the
patent; 2) the objective of the patent can still be obtained if the elements
at issue are replaced and that the accused product must result in identical
functions and effects of the patent; 3) a person skilled in the art, at the
time of infringement, would have conceived of the interchange of
elements between the accused product and the claimed invention; 4) the
accused product is novel and could not have been conceived by one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the patented invention; and 5) the
scope of the patent was not intentionally limited to exclude the accused
product. 47 This essential-nonessential test remains the foundation of the
doctrine in Japan.
When comparing these five elements to the U.S. doctrine, there are
many similarities with small technical differences. All the elements,
except possibly the first, have strong-almost exact-substantive
resemblances to the doctrine in the United States.4 8
For example, the second element has been called the "capability of
replacement" test.4 9 This element requires the patentee to prove the
accused product results in identical functions and effects of the patent.5 °
Therefore, by comparison, this element strongly resembles the functionway-result test of the U.S. doctrine by focusing on the function, result,
and effect of the equivalent. 5' The Japanese test, however, is textually
stricter, making it more difficult for the patentee to apply the doctrine.
In particular, the Japanese doctrine states the word "identical" as
opposed to "substantially the same" in the U.S.

44. Id. at 488-89.
45. Id. at 490.
46. Id. at 486.
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 49-68.
49. Takenaka II, supra note 40, at 129.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (holding
that the accused product is an equivalent "if it performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result").
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The third element of the Japanese doctrine has been called the
"obviousness" or "readiness of replacement" test. 52 Here, the patentee
must prove that a person skilled in the art would have readily conceived
of the small differences between the accused product and the claimed
invention at the time of the alleged infringement.5 3 This element
strongly resembles the "known interchangeability" standard mentioned
in Graver and later specified in Warner-Jenkinson.54 In particular, both
the U.S. "known interchangeability" test and the Japanese "obvious"
standard force the patentee to prove that the accused product's variations
of the claimed invention were foreseeable at the time of infringement."
However, this seems to be given less weight in the United States.
Next, the fourth element is known in Japan as "the defense of the
free state of the art."56 This element requires the accused to prove the
accused product did exist in the prior art at the time of application.57
This element relies on the premise that if the feature was in the prior art,
58
then the patentee would have failed to obtain a patent on that feature.
Therefore, on its face this element is the same as the "prior art
limitation" set forth in Wilson Sports.5 9 However, this element is
different in Japan because the burden of proof for the "prior art"
limitation is on the accused 6° -not the patentee, as in the United States.
The fifth element seems to be similar to patent prosecution history
estoppel in the United States. In Japan, the accused must prove the
patentee "intentionally" disclaimed the alleged equivalent feature from
the patent's scope.61 Prosecution history estoppel is applied differently
in the United States, however. First, in Japan, the burden is placed on
62
the accused to prove the patentee intentionally disclaimed the feature;
whereas, in the United States the burden rests on the patentee to prove
the amendment did not disclaim the alleged equivalent.6 3 Second, the
word "intentionally" implies a narrower scope to prosecution history

52. Takenaka II, supra note 40, at 129.
53. Id.
54. See Graver, 339 U.S. 605; Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 36 (1997).
supra note 40, at 129.
55. Takenaka I1,
56. Id.
57. See Takenaka 1,supra note 40.
58. Takenaka II,supra note 40, at 129.
59. See supra text accompanying note 18.
60. See Takenaka 1,supra note 40.
61. Takenaka II, supra note 40, at 130.
62. See Takenaka I, supra note 40.
63. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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estoppel when compared to the United States. 64 The courts have applied
the "dedication to the public domain" limitation here as in United States.
Additionally, the Japanese courts have applied prosecution history
estoppel regarding each argument or amendment made of record with
the JPO.6' The Ball Spline court ruling on this issue did not seem to
allow the patentee to rebut his dedication to the public. 66 In effect, the
prosecution history estoppel in Japan seems to create a non-rebuttable
presumption of surrender to the public.
Finally, the first element--or "non-essential-elements" testrequires the patentee to prove the accused product did not replace an
"essential" portion of the claimed invention. 67 In other words, the
accused product can replace only non-essential elements to have the
potential of infringing the patent. By comparison, this test vaguely
resembles the element-by-element test set forth in Warner-Jenkinson
because both tests require the court to look at each element independent
of each other.68
The "non-essential elements" test requires the court-unlike the
United States-to determine if the element is "essential."6 9 In effect, the
court's analysis usually turns on whether the element is essential. Here,
Japanese courts have interpreted "essential" inconsistently.
For
example, the Tokyo District Court has defined an essential element as
"being the technical features which give a basis for solving the problem
unique to the patented invention." 70 Other courts have focused on the
specification, prior art, and the prosecution history to identify the
features the patentee believes are distinguishable from the prior art, and
thus essential. 7 1 Therefore, this test is in contrast with the U.S. test of

64. For instance, U.S courts apply prosecution history estoppel as a limitation when a
narrowing amendment is made with no reason as to why the limitation was made. See, e.g.,
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
65. Takenaka II, supra note 40, at 130.
66. See generally Yamamoto, supra note 43.
67. Takenaka I, supra note 40.
68. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,29 (1997).
69. Id.
70. Toshiko Takenaka, The Essential Element Test Provides a Big Hurdle to Japanese
Doctrine of Equivalents, CENTER FOR ADVANCED RES. & STUDY ON INTELL. PROP. NEWSL. (U. of
Wash.
Sch.
of
Law,
Seattle,
Wash.),
Spring
2000,
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/2000/newsv7i2jp4.pdf (discussing Seisakusho v.
Furuta
Denki
K.K.
(Tokyo
Dist.
Ct.
Mar.
23,
2000),
available at
http://courtdomino.courts.go.jp/chiteki.nsf/c617a99bb925a29449256795007fb7d 1/4b959f287a6eba
2f492568ac001a67e0?OpenDocument (Takenaka III)).
71. Takenaka II, supra note 40, at 129.
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infringement that makes essential "each and every" element of the
claimed invention.72
Thus, I have highlighted a few minor differences of how the U.S.
and Japanese courts implement the doctrine. The two countries also
differ on how they procedurally analyze these cases. The Japanese
courts start with the equivalents analysis (i.e., elements 1-3) and if the
patentee satisfies these elements, then the court proceeds to allow the
accused to prove the limiting aspects of the doctrine (i.e., elements 45).73 Whereas the U.S. courts initially focus on the limitations of the
doctrine such as prosecution history estoppel, or the dedication to the
public; then, based on the findings and interpretation of the claims,
determine whether or not the doctrine is satisfied.74
The United States and Japan do implement the doctrine differently.
In the end, Japan has fewer cases filed under the doctrine and also has
fewer successful cases when the doctrine is invoked.75 The question
remains, however, whether the United States or Japan have the doctrine
right, or whether it can be better?
IV. CONCLUSION

The correct doctrine, as I propose, should reward the patentee who
has claimed his invention, and prosecuted it, with precision, brevity, and
accuracy in the language used. In order to understand this, one must
take a step back and understand that a patentee is granted a monopoly by
a government on a specific technology in exchange for disclosing that
specific technology to the public. Therefore, a fraud on the patent
system--and therefore the public-occurs when the patentee is able to
expand his invention past the metes and bounds of the claimed language.
As a ground rule it is important to note that the "scope of a patented
invention shall be determined on the basis of the patent claim(s)., 76 I
will assume, as most countries have, that an equivalent feature is one
that is able to realize substantially the same function, to achieve
72. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
73. See Jinseok Park, Interpretationof Patent Claims in the EPO, USPTO and JPO - in the
Context of the Doctrine of Equivalents and Functional Claims, EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV.
27(7), 237, 243-44 (2005) (stating that Japanese courts rarely get to the prosecution history estoppel
issue because they fail to get past the essential-elements test of element 1).
74. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the need to
examine the prosecution history estoppel and claim constructions issues before making a
determination as to the doctrine of equivalents).
75. Park, supranote 73 at 237,243-44(2005).
76. Japanese Patent Act, art. 70(1). This is also the case in the United States and generally
every country with a patent system.
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substantially the same result through substantially the same means as the
claimed feature. 77 Unlike the Japanese courts, I believe the inquiry into
whether an element is "essential" is an unnecessary and a costly inquiry
for the court to determine. Because the patent is defined by the claims,
"each and every" element 78 is a part of the invention providing no need
to distinguish between their importance.
Next, unlike Japan, the patent claim language should be construed
first. If this fails to happen, there is no floor to base the alleged
equivalent on; in other words, without an interpretation of the claim
language, we cannot determine if a feature is an equivalent. Here, the
burden should be placed on the patentee to prove that the a) patentee did
not dedicate the alleged equivalent to the public; b) prior art at the time
of invention did not contain the alleged equivalent; and c) the equivalent
was not obvious to a person of skill in the art at the time of invention. If
the patentee fails to prove any of the above, the claim should be limited
to that extent; as a result, it is unlikely the doctrine will apply.
Next, the court should determine if the alleged equivalents was
disclaimed during prosecution. Prosecution history estoppel should
apply to all claim amendments-not arguments-made by the
applicant.79 This will provide the added benefit of requiring the patent
examiner to force the applicant to manifest his arguments into claim
amendments.
Importantly, this results in precise claim drafting,
furthering the rule that the claim defines the scope of the invention (not
the arguments).80 There should be a non-rebuttable presumption with
respect to each specific feature that the applicant chose to disclaim
through amendment unless, however, the applicant unambiguously states
an intention, and a reason, why the amendment is not material to
patentability purposes. This prosecution history estoppel will create a
consistent, bright-line test to allow the public to determine, before
undertaking the alleged infringing act, the scope of the patent.
This prosecution history estoppel provides the right balance of both
the patentee's and the public's interest in the patent. With this, all of the

77. This has, for the most part, been the standard rule in China, the United Kingdom, the
United States, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Russia when attempting, either through the common law
or by statute, to define an equivalent feature. See generally Association Intemationale pour la
Protection de la Propridt6 Intellectuelle, Resolution Question Q175, The Role of Equivalents and
ProsecutionHistory in Defining the Scope of PatentProtection (Oct. 27, 2003).
78. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

79. In the United States, prosecution history estoppel applies to, among other unnecessarily
broad things, comments made to the examiner to the extent they are recorded. See Elkay Mfg. Co.
v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
80.

See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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arguments are made before the cost of litigation is undertaken. In the
current prosecution history estoppel, the line drawn is arbitrary and
relies on arguments after the actual act; whereas with this, either the
non-rebuttable presumption applies, or the disclaimer language is argued
against. For instance, if the patentee makes an amendment of, "at a pH
from approximately 6.0 to 9.0,,,81 stating the upper limit of 9.0 is made
to overcome the prior art, but is silent with respect to the lower level,
then prosecution history estoppel applies to both limits. However, if the
patentee had unambiguously stated the lower level amendment is not for
substantive prior art purposes, and the prior art demonstrated it was not,
the patentee will not be estopped from arguing an expansion of the lower
level.
Some may argue this will only give an incentive for the applicant to
argue that every amendment is not for substantive prior art purposes.
This is, however, why in the United States "[e]ach individual associated
with the filing and prosecution ... has a duty of candor and good faith in
dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office
all information ... material to patentability. ' 8 2 Thus, this clause or its
equivalent in other countries will theoretically prevent the applicant
from defrauding the patent system.
In the end, if implemented by the practitioner correctly, this may
broaden the scope of the patent's ability to be enforced through the
doctrine, while at the same providing a more concrete notice to the
public of the scope.
The claim scope should be fairly certain after the above-mentioned
limitations have been resolved. The court should subsequently look to
the doctrine to determine, on an element-by-element basis, whether the
alleged equivalent "performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the patentee's
device. 83 This is a fairly straightforward, albeit subjective, process, and I
would continue to allow the courts to determine this question.
The question still remains: What is the proper balance of interests?
My proposal provides a consistent, bright-line test to be applied, and it
places the burden on patent practitioners to fulfill their "duty of candor
and good faith" when dealing with the patent office. This will provide

81. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,22 (1997).
82. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2006). See also Japanese Patent Act, art. 197 (explaining that Japan has
a similar provision to prevent applicants from defrauding the patent system, where "[a]ny person
who has obtained a patent, . . . by means of fraudulent act shall be punished by imprisonmentwith
work not exceeding three years ... " (emphasis added)).
83. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,608 (1950).
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the public with better certainty when determining the scope of the
claims.
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